Gender Discrimination--The ERA v. Ladies Night, One State\u27s Perspective by Diggs, Jane
Tulsa Law Review 
Volume 15 Issue 2 
1979 
Gender Discrimination--The ERA v. Ladies Night, One State's 
Perspective 
Jane Diggs 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Jane Diggs, Gender Discrimination--The ERA v. Ladies Night, One State's Perspective, 15 Tulsa L. J. 366 
(2013). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol15/iss2/9 
This Casenote/Comment is brought to you for free and open access by TU Law Digital Commons. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Tulsa Law Review by an authorized editor of TU Law Digital Commons. For more 
information, please contact megan-donald@utulsa.edu. 
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
GENDER DISCRIMINATION-THE ERA v. "LADIES NIGHT," ONE
STATE'S PERSPECTIVE-MacLean v. First Northwest Industries of
America, Inc., 24 Wash. App. 161, 600 P.2d 1027 (1979).
I. INTRODUCTION
The often bitter debate continues. Should a twenty-eighth amend-
ment be added to the United States Constitution declaring that "Equal-
ity of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the
United States or by any state on account of sex?"' As voting continues
on ratification until the 1982 extended deadline2 is reached, the ques-
tion remains unanswered.
The major question raised in this debate is the potential effect of
the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA).' Advocates pro and con the
ERA have answers. Legal commentators have compared the Supreme
Court's treatment of racial discrimination with the Court's probable
1. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVIII, § 1 (proposed).
2. The amendment was proposed by Congress on March 22, 1972, and submitted to the
state legislatures for ratification. Using its article V powers for proposing amendments, Congress
set a seven-year limitation period for passage by the necessary three-fourths of the states. H.R.
Res. 264, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 116 CONG. REc. 36862 (1970); 117 CONG. REc. 35815 (1971). In
that period of time (which should have ended March 22, 1979), only thirty-five of the requisite
thirty-eight votes for passage were acquired. Supporters of the Equal Rights Amendment, aware
that chances for passage were slim, proposed House Joint Resolution 638 to extend the period for
ratification. H.R.J. Res. 638, 95th Cong., 1st sess., 123 CONG. REC. H 11631 (1977) and S.J. Res.
134, 95th Cong. 2nd sess., 124 CONG. REC. S7639 (1978). The new deadline set by that Resolution
was June 30, 1982. Since the time for an extended deadline was set, no other state has voted for its
ratification. Five states, on the other hand, have voted to rescind. The constitutionality of re-
scinding has not been determined. See Emerson & Duker, EA4.: Stretching The Deadline, 7
HUMAN RIGHTS 20 (1978).
3. Among legal commentators the single goal of achieving equal rights for women appears
unchallenged. The means to achieve that goal, however, are several. There appear to be two
general approaches. Proponents of the ERA find it a necessary and fundamental change which
will most effectively achieve the goal. Opponents approach the argument from the standpoint that
enforcement of the fourteenth amendment, specific congressional acts, and Supreme Court pro-
nouncements, would be adequate and more beneficial. See Treadwell & Page, EqualRights Pro'i-
sions: The Experience Under State Consttutions, 65 CALIF. L. REv. 1086, 1087 (1977). See also
Freund, The Equal Rights Amendment Is Not the Way, 6 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 234 (1971).
1
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treatment of sex discrimination after ratification of the ERA.4 Also,
court opinions from states with equal rights amendment in their consti-
tutions also provide useful predictions of the likely interpretation of a
federal ERA.' At least sixteen states have added an equal rights
amendment to their state constitutions. These amendments are similar
(frequently identical) to the proposed federal one.6 The judicial inter-
pretation of cases brought under such state amendments may provide
insight into the application of a federal ERA.
Recently MacLean v. First Northwest Industries of America, Inc.7
was decided by the First Division of the Washington Court of Appeals.
This case answers one question concerning equal rights for women-
the fate of "Ladies' Night."8 It is not the first Washington decision
interpreting that state's equal rights amendment,9 but is one in a series
of cases cumulatively building a framework for the determination of
gender discrimination in Washington.' 0 This note will analyze the de-
cision in MacLean as well as examine prior Washington cases leading
to this decision. In so doing, this note will examine Washington's con-
4. Brown, Emerson, Falk, & Freedman, The Equal Rights Amendment." A Constitutional Ba-
sisfor Equal Rightsfor Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871 (1971). Rubin, Sex Discrimination in Interscho-
lastic High SchoolAthletics, 25 SYRACUSE L. REv. 535 (1974).
5. Several results have occurred, depending upon the standard of review used by that partic-
ular court. If a "rational relationship" test was used, rarely were sex discrimination findings up-
held. Murphy v. Murphy, 232 Ga. 352, 206 S.E.2d 458 (1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 929 (1975).
Warshafsky v. Journal Co., 63 Wisc. 2d 130, 216 N.W.2d 197 (1974). The standard of strict scru-
tiny has been used by at least one court to find a violation of a state equal rights amendment.
People v. Ellis, 57 Ill. 2d 127, 311 N.E.2d 98 (1974). Finally, a standard even more restrictive than
strict scrutiny has been used by some states. See infra, notes 34-59 and accompanying text. See
also Treadwell & Page, supra note 3.
6. ALAS. CONST., art. I, § 3; COLO. CONST., art. II, § 29; CONN. CONST., art. I, § 20; HAWAII
CONST., art. I, § 21; ILL. CONST., art. I, § 18; LA. CONST., art. I, § 3; MD. CONST., Declaration of
Rights, art. 46; MASS. CONST., pt. I, art. I; MONT. CONST. art. II § 4; N.M. CONST., art. II, § 18; PA.
CONST., art. I, § 28; TEx. CONST., art. I, § 3a; UTAH CONST., art. IV, § 1; VA. CONST., art. I, § 11;
WASH. CONST., art. XXXI, § 1; WYo. CONST., art. I, § 3; Wyo. CONST., art. VI, § 1. The above
statutes are compiled in Treadwell & Page, supra note 3, at 1111-12.
7. 24 Wash. App. 161, 600 P.2d 1027 (1979).
8. Id. at _, 600 P.2d at 1028.
9. See City of Seattle v. Buchanan, 90 Wash. 2d 584, 584 P.2d 918 (1978); Marchioro v.
Chaney, 90 Wash. 2d 298, 582 P.2d 487 (1978); Darrin v. Gould, 85 Wash. 2d 859, 540 P.2d 882
(1975); Singer v. Hara, 11 Wash. App. 247, 522 P.2d 1187 (1974).
The Washington equal rights amendment is essentially identical to the proposed federal
ERA. Washington adds the phrase, "and responsibilities." In full, the Washington equal rights
amendment provides, "Equality of rights and responsibility under the law shall not be denied or
abridged on account of sex." Wash. Const. amend. LXI, § 1. Whether this additional language is
significant has not been made known. The MacLean court did not rely on this language in deter-
mining that the ticket-pricing practice was unconstitutionally discriminating on the basis of sex.
10. See notes 39-52 infra.
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struction of its equal rights amendment and those effects of the federal
ERA which this decision may foretell.
II. THE WASHINGTON DECISION
MacLean was decided on September 10, 1979. The defendants
were First Northwest Industries of America, Inc., owner of the Seattle
Supersonics, and the City of Seattle, lessor of the coliseum where Su-
personics games are held."' The named plaintiff sought damages for
the owner's ticket pricing practice known as "Ladies' Night," alleging
that it constituted sex discrimination. Tickets for Sunday night Super-
sonics games were sold to women for half the price they were sold to
men. The purpose was to encourage women to attend.' 2
The trial court granted the defendants an order of dismissal pursu-
ant to summary judgment. The appellate court reversed. In so doing,
two fundamental issues were addressed. The first was whether the "La-
dies' Night" policy of selling tickets to women at half the price of a
man's ticket constituted gender discrimination. Resolving the first issue
required a finding of state action. The second issue, arising only if the
refusal to sell a basketball ticket to a man for the same price that a
woman could pay constituted sex discrimination, was whether such dis-
crimination was prohibited by law-constitutional, statutory, or both.t'
The court of appeals answered each question affirmatively.' 4
A. Sate Action
To find actionable discrimination under the state constitution, the
court had to determine that the ticket pricing practice could be charac-
terized as state action.' 5 Because of the particularly close ties between
the defendants, the court had little difficulty in finding state action.' 6
11. 24 Wash. App. at -_., 600 P.2d at 1028 (1979). The suit was a class action filed by plaintiff
MacLean after his demand to purchase a Supersonics game ticket at the "Ladies' Night," half-
price rate was denied.
12. Id. at ., 600 P.2d at 1029.
13. Id. at _. 600 P.2d at 1028.
14. Id. at .. 600 P.2d at 1034.
15. Id. at _, 600 P.2d at 1029. The court here construed the 61st amendment of the Wash-
ington constitution to constrain only government action. The same interpretation has been given
to most of the United States constitution. See, e.g., Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978);
Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954); Shelly v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
16. The Supreme Court in Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556 (1974), a case in-
volving race discrimination, maintained without deciding that "the question of the existence of
state action centers in the extent of the city's involvement. . . and in whether that involvement
makes the city 'a joint particpant in the challenged activity, which, on that account, cannot be
[Vol. 15:366
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The role of the City of Seattle as lessor of the colliseum provided the
nexus17 needed to find state action.' 8 As lessor to First Northwest In-
dustries, the city owned and operated the coliseum for public events.
The court characterized the coliseum as "a public-owned facility for
public accommodation assemblies and amusement."' 9
The lease itself provided further proof of the state connection. It
provided that "said Lessee will comply with all laws of the United
States, and of the State of Washington. . . .The Lessee agrees to com-
ply with all state and local laws prohibiting discrimination with regard
to race, color, creed, sex, age or national origin."20 Supersonic or not
fans, whether they realized it, were involved with the state each time
they attended a game.
The court, in determining that state action was involved, relied on
federal discrimination cases under the fourteenth amendment.2' For
example, the court cited Burton v. Wilmington ParkingAuthority, a case
concerning race discrimination, in support of the finding of state action.
In Burton, a private restaurant leased parking space for its customers
from the Wilmington Parking Authority.2 When the restaurant re-
fused to serve a black solely on the basis of his race, the Supreme Court
found that state action was involved. Because of the existing lease from
the public authority, the restaurant owner could not characterize his
actions as purely private.23 As would later be the case in MacLean,
considered to have been so purely private as to fall without the scope of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.'" Id. at 573 (emphasis added).
17. The term nexus is used here to describe the necessary connection between the discrimina-
tory act and the state entity involved. The Supreme Court has avoided delineating a definite test
for finding the connection needed for state action. The "[C]ourt has never attempted the 'impossi-
ble task' of formulating an infallible test for determining whether the state 'in any of its manifesta-
tions' has become significantly involved in private discriminations." Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S.
369, 378 (1967).
18. Wimbish v. Pinellas County, 342 F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1965). In Wimbish the court focused
on the language of the lease and determined that the county as lessor exercised a considerable
amount of control over the golf course in conjunction with the lessee, a private corporation. Inter-
estingly, the Wimbish lease made no reference to discrimination with regard to race, color, creed,
sex, age, or national origin as did the lease in MacLean.
19. 24 Wash. App. at -, 600 P.2d at 1028.
20. Id. "When a municipality leases its property, it is engaged in state action." Id. at , 600
P.2d at 1028.
21. Id. The court stated, "We are guided in this inquiry by an examination of federal cases
which sought to determine, in a similar context, whether a state or local government had so partic-
ipated in the discrimination that it had violated the Fourteenth Amendment ....
22. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
23. The Wilmington Parking Authority was created by the City of Wilmington to alleviate
the parking crisis in that city by building and maintaining facilities for public parking. The facili-
ties were publicly funded for public purposes. Id. at 715.
19791
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merely leasing from a government entity resulted in state action.24
The MacLean court also cited two other similar federal cases as
authority. Both of these involved sex discrimination. Both found state
action on the basis of state licenses under which private parties were
operating. The degree of state involvement in both cases, as well as in
Burton, nearly parallels that found in MacLean.25 In Bennett v. Dyer's
Chop House, Inc. ,26 two women were refused service at the defendant's
restaurant. The restaurant was state licensed. Its policy was to serve
only men from 11:00 a.m. to 1:30 p.m. Monday through Friday al-
though it served women during its other open hours. The court found
that such refusal of service was unconstitutional discrimination under
the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution.
The finding of state action Bennett was based on the economic
benefit given the defendant by the state in issuing him a license. Had
the issue turned on licensing alone, the court said it would have hesi-
tated to find state action, noting that the Supreme Court had never defi-
nitely made a statement regarding that matter.28 Rather, the Bennet
finding rested on an economic benefit conferred by the issuance of a
license. That benefit derived from the limited number of liquor
licenses issued by the state.
The next federal case cited by MacLean was a forerunner of
Bennett. On facts almost identical to Bennett, the Southern District of
24. Id.
25. The method by which state action is found is difficult to pinpoint. In Burton the Court
said, "Only by sifting facts and weighing circumstances can the nonobvious involvement of the
State in private conduct be attributed its true significance." Id. at 722.
The MacLean court, in weighing the state involvement with the team through the lease agree-
ment and the team's use of the city facility, found ample evidence of state involvement. The result
was a finding of state action.
26. 350 F. Supp. 153 (N.D. Ohio 1972).
27. Id. at 156.
28. Id. at 154. The court cited the differences between the opinions of Justices Douglas and
Black on the issue of whether licensing alone constitutes state action. Compare Reitmann v.
Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 384-86 (1967) (California real estate brokerage industry is state-licensed
and subject to the prohibitions of the fourteenth amendment) (Douglas, J., concurring), with Bell
v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 326-35 (1964). "Businesses owned by private persons do not become
agencies of the State because they are licensed. ... Id. at 333 (Black, J., dissenting).
But see Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972), a case decided just a few months
prior to Bennett, wherein the Court determined that the licensing of the Lodge's private club by
the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board did not amount to such state involvement with the club's
activities as to constitute state action. Even though the Board had extensive regulatory authority
over liquor licensees in Pennsylvania, the Court reasoned that this in no "way foster[ed or en-
courage[d] racial discrimination. . . .The limited effect of the prohibition against obtaining addi-
tional club licenses when the maximum number of retail licenses allotted. . . has been issued. ..
falls far short of conferring upon club licensees a monopoly. ... Id. at 176-77.
5
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New York, in the case of Seidenberg v. McSorley's Old Ale House,
Ina.,29 found state action because "the licensing practices of the SLA
[State Liquor Authority]. .. restrict[ed] competition between vendors
of alcoholic beverages, thus conferring on license holders a significant
state-derived economic benefit approximating the state support pro-
vided by the lease involved in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Author-
ity."5
3 0
Based on the above precedent, the Washington court concluded
that the lease of the coliseum by the City of Seattle was state action.31
The City of Seattle was not merely a licensor and regulator but the
owner and operator of the facility where the games were played. Al-
though the Supreme Court itself has recognized that there can be no
infallible test for state action, 3z the finding of state action in this in-
stance seems consistent with prior decisions.33
B. Violation of Washington's Equal Rights Amendment
Once the MacLean court found state action, the next step was to
determine whether the equal rights amendment to the Washington
Constitution had been violated. That amendment states, "Equality of
rights and responsibility under the law shall not be denied or abridged
on account of sex."'34 The amendment was first interpreted in Darrin v.
Gould.35 The court in MacLean relied heavily on Gould because of its
treatment of the constitutional standards used in determining the exist-
ence of discrimination. In Gould, a public high school had prohibited
two qualified girls from playing football. The court found that the pro-
hibition, made solely on the ground that these students were girls, was
discrimination based on gender and therefore unconstitutional.36
Gould has been characterized as one of the most far-reaching sex
discrimination cases.3 7 Thus, it is not surprising that the MacLean
29. 317 F. Supp. 593 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
30. Id. at 603 (citation omitted).
31. 24 Wash. App. at_, 600 P.2d at 1030.
32. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 378 (1967).
33. For a more detailed analysis of the state action question, see L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW § 18-1 at 1147 (1978). Professor Tribe advances the argument that one consid-
eration in the state action is whether the target of the relief sought is a governmental body or
merely a private person. State action, he proposes, is more likely to be found when the relief
sought is to be obtained from the governmental body. Id. at 1148 n.7.
34. WASH. CONST. amend. LXI § 1.
35. 85 Wash. 2d 859, 540 P.2d 882 (1975).
36. Id. at _, 540 P.2d at 883-84.
37. Treadwell & Page, supra note 3, at 1100.
1979]
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court's reliance on this case resulted in the finding of a violation of the
Washington ERA. The standard of review applied in Gould to find
that the discrimination was unconstitutional was even more penetrating
than that of strict scrutiny, the test usually applied in race discrimina-
tion cases. Strict scrutiny has never been applied by a majority of the
United States Supreme Court in cases of sex discrimination.38 As a
result of this far-reaching approach, the Gould court easily found un-
constitutional sex discrimination under the Washington ERA. The
court justified its broad application in this manner:
Const. art. 31, provided the latest expression of the con-
stitutional law of the state, dealing with sex discrimination, as
adopted by the people themselves. Presumably the people in
adopting Const. art. 31 intended to do more than repeat what
was already contained in the otherwise governing constitu-
tional provisions, federal and state, by which discrimination
based on sex was permissible under the rational relationship
and strict scrutiny tests. Any other view would mean the peo-
ple intended to accomplish no change in the existing constitu-
tional law governing sex discrimination, except possibly to
make the validity of a classification based on sex come within
the suspect class under Const. art. 1, § 12. Had such a limited
purpose been intended, there would have been no necessity to
resort to the broad, sweeping, mandatory language of the
Equal Rights Amendment.39
Although Gould made it apparent that classifications based upon
sex will trigger judicial scrutiny somewhat more rigid than even tradi-
38. Under the strict scrutiny test of equal protection analysis, only compelling state interests
will allow the classification that results in discrimination. The test is harsh and almost inevitably
results in the classification being struck down as unconstitutional. See Gunther, The Supreme
Court, 1971 Term-Foreward" In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Modelfor a
Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. I (1972). Strict scrutiny is employed when legislative
or administrative classifications "distribute benefits or burdens in a manner inconsistent with fun-
damental rights." L. TRIBE, supra note 32, § 16-7. The rights which have been treated with strict
scrutiny by the Supreme Court have included: the right to travel, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618 (1969); the right to vote, Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); the right to
criminal appeals, Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S, 12 (1956). The categories which have received strict
scrutiny include: race, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); and alienage, Hernandez v. Texas,
347 U.S. 475 (1954).
The case of Frontiero v. Richardson brought the Supreme Court close to finding that sex
classifications should be regarded with strict scrutiny. The plurality opinion stated that sex should
be regarded as a suspect classification; however, the concurring opinions found that the statement
was unnecessarily broad for the determination of the case and that it was improper to make such a
finding at a time when the ERA was in the process of being voted upon. 411 U.S. 677, 691-92
(1973).
39. 85 Wash. 2d at _, 540 P.2d at 889 (citations omitted).
[Vol. 15:366
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tional strict scrutiny, the rationale to be used in applying this stricter
test was not made altogether clear. Did the court intend to ban the use
of sex as a classification on which laws could be based? Or, does the
court simply require a closer nexus between the sex-based classifica-
tions and the assumptions providing the basis for statutory classifica-
tions?4" An examination of other Washington cases considering this
question provides some insight into the matter.
One case discussing the effects of the Gould opinion was State v.
Wood.4 In Wood, the natural father of an illegitimate child was re-
quired by statute to contribute equally with the mother to the "care,
education and support of such child."'42 In determining that the statute
was constitutional, the Washington Supreme Court said that Gould de-
clared sex to be a suspect classification requiring strict scrutiny.43 A
different interpretation of the Gould opinion was rendered in Marchioro
v. Chaney," also decided by the Washington Supreme Court. There
the court upheld a state statute governing the administration of state
political committees and requiring an equal number of males and fe-
males on such committees.45 In reference to Washington's equal rights
amendment, the court stated:
Under the equal rights amendment, the equal protec-
tion/suspect classification test is replaced by the single crite-
rion: Is the classification by sex discriminatory? or, in the
language of the amendment, Has equality been denied or
abridged on account of sex?4 6
The Mfarchioro court went on to say that this reading of the Washing-
ton ERA did not prohibit the government from taking steps "to assure
40. To ban the use of sex as a relevant classification is to adopt a totally "sex-blind" standard.See Treadwell & Page, srupra note 3, at 1101-02. Such a standard may be analogized to the color-
blind standard enunciated by Justice Harlan's dissent in Plessey v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559
(1896). Were such a standard adopted, no statute or regulation apparently classifying by gender
could be upheld unless a court can determine that the legislation was not motivated by a desire to
classify by gender. See note 52, infra. See also Singer v. Hara, II Wash. App. 247, 522 P.2d 1187
(1974), wherein the court found that Washington's prohibition against same-sex marriage was not
based solely on sex and therefore was constitutional. For a discussion of Singer, see Comment,
Fundamental Interests and the Question of Same-Sex Marriage, 15 TULSA L.J. 141, 145 (1979).
To require only a shorter nexus between the sex-based classifications and the assumptions
providing the basis for statutory classifications is a more tolerant method of review. Under this
approach, a court would consider justifications for sex-based classifications and not automatically
reject all such enactments. See Treadwell & Page, supra note 3, at 1102.
41. 89 Wash. 2d 97, 569 P.2d 1148 (1977).
42. Id. at _, 569 P.2d at 1150-51, construing WASH. REv. CODE § 26.24.090 (1965).
43. 89 Wash. 2d at _ 569 P.2d at 1150.
44. 90 Wash. 2d 298, 582 P.2d 487 (1978).
45. WASH. REv. CODE §§ 29.42.020, 29.42.030 (1965).
46. 90 Wash. 2d at , 582 P.2d at 491.
1979]
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women actual as well as theoretical equality of rights"47 even though
Gould held that "discrimination on account of sex is forbidden. 48
Marchioro, then, represents a softening of the standard of review an-
nounced in Gould.
City of Seattle v. Buchanan,49 a recent case involving a Seattle city
ordinance forbidding the public exposure of female breasts as lewd
conduct, 50 illustrates the standard of review that now seems applicable
to gender-based classifications in Washington. The court cited Gould
in its decision to uphold the ordinance. It found that the Gould opinion
was based on a recognition that individual characteristics, not sexual
categories, can serve as distinguishing qualifications. The statute is
permissible so long as it "serves a rational purpose based upon actual
differences which are present in every member of the particular sex.'
The discrimination in Buchanan was based on unique physical charac-
teristics of the female sex and, therefore, held not to be a violation of
equal protection. 2
Although it is apparent that the Washington courts, in applying
their ERA, will use a test more stringent than that currently favored by
the United States Supreme Court,53 it is equally apparent that when
traditional values are at stake, those courts are willing to short-circuit
the analysis by finding that the statute in question is not gender-based.
The MacLean court had available persuasive authority from another
47. Id. (quoting Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, The EqualRightsAmendment:.4 Consti-
tutional Basisfor Equal Rightsfor Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871, 904 (1971).
48. 85 Wash. 2d 859, -, 540 P.2d at 882, 893.
49. 90 Wash. 2d 584, 584 P.2d 918 (1978).
50. SaErrLF, WASH. ORDINANCES § 12A.12.150.
51. 90 Wash. 2d at , 584 P.2d at 919.
52. Id. In Buchanan, the defendant charged with violation of the lewd conduct ordinance
contended that there is no difference between the breasts of the male and the female "sufficient to
justify a law forbidding the exposure of the breasts of one and not the other ...." Id. The
court, however, believed that the city's concern was with the protection of morals and that there is
a difference between the breasts of a man and a woman. "The female breats, which, unlike male
breasts, constitute an errogenous zone and are commonly associated with sexual arousal." Id. at
_ 584 P.2d at 920.
This is not the first time that a Washington court has allowed a seemingly sex-based classifi-
cation to escape being struck down as unconstitutional. In a prior case, Singer v. Hara, I I Wash.
App. 247, 522 P.2d 1187 (1974), the court found no discrimination in the statutory prohibition of
same-sex marriage. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.24.010 (1965). The court reasoned that the definition
of marriage allowed such a legal relationship to exist only between one man and one woman.
Neither two men nor two women could marry, therefore no discrimination was present. Such a
decision in a state with one of the strongest interpretations of its ERA demonstrates the effect of
characterizing the classification so that sex is not at issue. So, even those the state courts holding
that their ERA requires the strictest of strict scrutiny can find that the statute was not sex based
and save it from a binding of unconstitutionality.
53. See note 38 supra and accompanying text.
[Vol. 15:366
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jurisdiction. A New York case, Abosh v. New York Yankees, Inc. ,
also involved sex discrimination in the form of "Ladies' Night," which
was found to be sex discrimination under a New York statute." New
York has no equal rights amendment but the statute prohibited prefer-
ential treatment between men and women. The defendant's argument
that the price would encourage family bonds between the male and
female family members was found to be unsupportable.
Respondents' argument, although praiseworthy, is untenable
in that it presupposes intact families where every woman has
a man to take care of her. Unfortunately, that is not the case
in America today, where 11.5% of all families are headed by
woman and where 40% of all working women are either sin-
gle, divorced, deserted, widowed, separated or abandoned.5 6
In addition to Abosh, the MacLean court had recent Supreme
Court authority sufficiently analogous to lend support to its opinion. In
Orr v. Orr,.7 the Court declared an Alabama statute that provided for
alimony payments by husbands but not wives to be unconstitutional.
The Court particularly warned against the danger of prolonging the
effects of past discrimination by attempting to compensate for it by sup-
posedly favoring females.5 8
The MacLean court concluded that the ticket-pricing practice vio-
lated the state's ERA. Although the Washington courts in the prior
cases were willing to circumvent application of the state ERA by find-
ing no sex classification, the MacLean Court was not. 9
54. No. CPS-25284, Appeal No. 1194 (N.Y. State Human Rights Appeal Bd., July 19, 1972),
as cited in MacLean v. First N.W. Indust. of Am. Inc. 24 Wash. App. _, 600 P.2d 1027, 1031.
55. N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 296.2 (McKinney).
56. No. CPS-25284, Appeal No. 1194 (N.Y. State Human Rights Appeal Bd., July 19, 1972),
as cited in MacLean v. First N.W. Indust. of Am. Inc. 24 Wash. App. _, 600 P.2d 1027, 1031.
57. 99 S. Ct. 1102 (1979).
58. The Court cited Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), to uphold its right to scrutinize
discrimination against males as well as females. 99 S. Ct. at 111 I.
59. The MacLean court also found that the ticket-pricing scheme complained of violated
Washington's Law Against Discrimination," WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60 (Supp. 1979). This viola-
tion was not a condition precedent to a finding that the state ERA had been violated and accord-
ingly is not particularly relevant to the scope of this note. Whatever influence this statute had on
the outcome of the ERA issue cannot be determined by examining the court's opinion. However,
one particular analogy drawn by the court deserves repeating here:
The injustice of the case at bar would readily be recognized as impermissible if it
arose in the context of race. It would be inconceivable to have a "Blacks' Night" or a
"Whites' Night" or a "Filipinos' Night" at the Seattle Center Coliseum. It would be
unsupportable for the City of Seattle to increase its coffers or take in any revenues on the
basis of race classifications.
24 Wash. App. at - 600 P.2d at 1032. This reasoning seems as applicable to an analysis of the
ERA issue and gives a strong indication that the court did not view the "Ladies' Night" as a
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III. A FEDERAL ERA?
The MacLean decision provides one piece of the puzzle in predict-
ing the effect of a federal ERA. Regarding the state action issue,
MacLean likely represents the approach the Supreme Court would
take, were it called upon to resolve a similar issue.60 To test for state
action in sex discrimination cases by the precedent set in Equal Protec-
tion could mean a broad potential for enforcement of the federal ERA.
As demonstrated by Burton and MacLean, even an act so seemingly
insignificant as renting space from a government agency could result in
a finding of state action.
Opponents of the ERA fear this far-reaching effect on their lives.61
Perhaps this fear is somewhat unfounded if the purpose and effect of
the state action analysis is properly considered. 62 Where purely private
action is involved, the ERA would not apply. The ERA would prohibit
only state discrimination on the basis of sex. It is readily apparent that
the approach taken by the courts to find state action will have a signifi-
cant effect on the reach of the ERA if it is ever ratified.
Beyond state action, the issue which MacLean exposes is the po-
tential for a federal ERA to strike down every example of discrimina-
tion based on sex. Washington has moved beyond the Supreme
Court's rational relationship test and perhaps beyond even the strict
scrutiny test used for determining race discrimination.63 The MacLean
court justified its adoption of such a strict test on Washington's ERA.64
Whether the federal ERA will be applied with similar enthusiasm is an
unanswerable question at this time. The Washington court viewed the
traditional practice worthy of a non-sex-based characterization as was previously done in the cases
involving breast exposure, Buchanan, and same-sex marriage, Singer.
60. See generally Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, The Equal flghts Amendment. A Con-
stitutional Basis for Equal Rightsfor Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871 (1971).
61. See Freund, The Equal Righis Amendment is Not the Way, 6 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. Rav.
234, 234, 238 (1971): Kurland, The Equal Rights Amendment: Some Problems of Constrntion, 6
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 243, 246-47 (1971).
62. A finding of state action is not automatic. See, e.g., Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.,
419 U.S. 345 (1974), wherein a privately owned and operated utility company that held a certifica-
tion of public convenience issued by the state's regulatory commission, was granted a partial mo-
nopoly on public utilities in the area, and was subject to extensive government regulation was not
required to comply with due process notice and hearing procedures prior to terminating service to
a customer. The Supreme Court found insufficient state action to justify application of the four-
teenth amendment. Id. at 358. See notes 26-33 supra and accompanying text. Under the current
mode of finding state action it seems clear that if the Seattle Supersonics had played their games in
a privately owned facility and did not receive other governmental support for their franchise,
"Ladies' Night" would be an allowable practice.
63. See note 52 supra and accompanying text.
64. See note 38 supra.
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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
passage of its ERA as a statement by the people that they desired a
more severe prohibition on sex discrimination than had previously
been applied.65 It remains to be seen whether the courts will find this
to be the case for the federal ERA and just how strict the test for sex
discrimination will become.
Good or bad, a federal ERA could be a broad, sweeping pro-
nouncement, preventing nearly every form of discrimination based on
sex. As the Washington courts have sometimes held, it could possibly
ban gender as an allowable classification. 66 In that event, only charac-
terization of classifications as non-sex-based,67 or a finding that the
classification was based on physical differences inherent in every mem-
ber of the gender affected, would allow the classification to stand.68
IV. CONCLUSION
The decision in MacLean illustrates one state's interpretation of its
equal rights legislation. It has further clarified Washington's stand on
sex discrimination. Additionally, the decision provides insight into the
difficult question of what effect a federal ERA, if ratified, would have
on the Supreme Court's treatment of sex discrimination cases. Oppo-
nents of the ERA will point to the MacLean decision as an example of
more government intrusion into their private lives. Those in favor of
the ERA will applaud the decision. They may be heard to say, "Give
me equal prices for equal entertainment along with equal pay for my
job. The spending of money for entertainment can then be done with
more freedom."
Jane Diggs
65. Darrin v. Gould, 85 Wash.2d 859, _, 540 P.2d 882, 889 (1975).
66. See note 52 supra and accompanying text.
67, See, e.g., Singer v. Hara, II Wash. App. 247, 522 P.2d 1187 (1974) (prohibition of same-
sex marriage not a sex-based classification).
68. See, e.g., note 52 sufpra.
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